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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of futures trading in a market for
a storable commodity, in which producers and speculators are assumed to
be risk averse and specifications of the aggregate supply and inventory
demand functions are derived from explicit optimization. A critical
aspect is how the parameters of these functions change with the intro-
duction of the future market as it is through these induced parameter
changes that the futures market exerts its influence on the spot price.
The effects of the futures market on both the long-run average spot
price and its variance are analyzed. While we are unable to draw any
definitive conclusions on this issue, we find that in all cases con-
sidered the futures market stabilizes the spot price, as well as lowering
its long-run mean.

1 . INTRODUCTION
For many years now, the question of the effects of futures trading on the
stability of spot prices has been extensively debated. This topic has been discussed
at various levels. For example, farmers and agricultural interest groups have
claimed that futures trading destabilizes spot prices, thereby imposing welfare
losses on the economy. In the United States, Congress has decided that futures
trading can cause price destabilization and has subjected futures trading to the
regulation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. At a more analytical level,
economists have been investigating the issue, both empirically, and more recently,
theoretically as well.
The empirical work extends as far back as Emery (1896) . The typical
approach is to consider two periods, one with, and the other without, futures trad-
ing and to compare the variances of the spot prices in the two cases. This has
been carried out for a large number of specific commodities markets and the results
are not uniform. Several authors find that futures markets definitely reduce price
fluctuations: see, e.g., Hieronymus (1960), Working (1960), Gray (1963), and Cox
(1976) for the onions markets; Hooker (1901) and Tomek (1971) for the wheat market;
Emery (1896) for the cotton market; Powers (1970), Taylor and Leuthold (1974) and
Cox (1976) for the cattle market. Other authors find that there is no essential gain
in stability: see, e.g., Johnson (1973) for the onions market; Naik (1970) for the
hessian market. These are just a small sample of what has become a vast literature.
Parallel to this, several economists have tried to provide a theoretical
answer to the issue; see, e.g., Peck (1976), Turnovsky (1979) and Sarris (1980).
The approach adopted by these authors is to compare the stability of the spot price,
as measured by its asymptotic variance, with and without a futures market, for
given (arbitrarily specified) behavioral relationships for the agents in the mar-
ket. The general conclusions of these theoretical analyses is that under their
respective assumptions, the futures market almost certainly stabilizes the spot
price.
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As has been recently pointed out by Kawai (1981a) and Turnovsky (1981)
these theoretical studies suffer from a fundamental deficiency. Specifically,
they assume that the coefficients of the relevant supply and inventory demand
functions remain unchanged with the introduction of the futures market. But
except in the polar case where all individuals are risk neutral, this assumption
is invalid. If producers and speculators are risk averse, the slopes of the
relevant supply and inventory demand functions depend upon the degree of price
stability and this in turn varies with the introduction of the futures market.
To incorporate these important aspects adequately, it is necessary to derive the
behavioral relationships for firms and speculators from underlying optimizing
considerations, similar to those employed by Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979),
Feder, Just and Schmitz (1980), Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and others. Indeed,
unless one casts the analysis in such a framework, one has no firm theoretical
basis for drawing any inference as to the effects of futures market trading on
the distribution of the spot price.
Unlike the earlier studies we have noted, the Kawai and Turnovsky analyses
are restricted to non-storable commodities. While futures markets for some such
commodities exist, it is important to extend this approach to the more general
case where commodities are assumed to be storable, thereby permitting private
individuals to hold inventories. This is undertaken in the present paper. In
doing so, we employ a rational expectations framework, in which all agents have
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access to identical information. We restrict our attention to the question of
stabilization in the face of final demand and aggregate supply disturbances, which
generally are presumed to be the underlying sources of the random fluctuations in
the spot price.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the
determination of the market equilibrium price in the absence of the futures market.
Section 3 introduces the futures market and derives the optimal behavior of risk
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averse firms and speculators. Based on this behavior, the solutions for the short-
run market clearing spot and futures prices are derived. The next section presents
general expressions for comparing the long-run mean spot price and its variance with
and without the futures market. While a general unambiguous comparison is not possible,
several channels through which the introduction of the futures market exerts its
influence can be identified. Section 5 undertakes these comparisons for a number
of important special cases. These include: (i) risk neutral speculators; (ii) risk
neutral producers; (iii) risk neutral speculators and producers; (iv) pure production
(i.e., no inventories); (v) pure inventory holdings (i.e., no production); (vi) con-
stand marginal inventory costs. Taken together, these results suggest that for
the classes of disturbances considered by the analysis, namely disturbances in
final demand and/or supply, the introduction of a futures market almost certainly
provides a stabilizing influence. The main conclusions and some further comments
are given in Section 6.
2. PRICE DETERMINATION IN THE ABSENCE OF A FUTURES MARKET
There are three groups of participants in the market: (a) firms, (b) spec-
ulators, (c) consumers. We assume for convenience, but without any essential loss
3
of generality, that private storgae is the specialized activity of speculators. We
begin by considering the behavioral relationships of representative individuals from
each group.
A. Derivation of Underlying Microeconomic Behavioral Relationships
The representative firm is assumed to be perfectly competitive and to
produce its output subject to a quadratic cost function. Its profit function in
period t is therefore described by
*' Vt - ¥\ (1)
where
y = planned output, chosen by the representative firm, upon
which costs are incurred,
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y = actual output of the firm,
P = spot price of output at time t taken as parameterically
given to the firm.
We shall assume that the firm makes its production decision for time t at time t-1,
before the actual spot price P is known. Because of random fluctuations in produc-
tion conditions , assumed to be beyond the control of the firm, actual and planned
outputs are related by
yt
- yt +
v; (2)
where v' is an additive random variable, having zero mean and finite variance.
Combining equations (1) and (2) yields
\ = pA + v t> - Kt •
To preserve the linearity of the model, we shall assume that the firm
maximizes the following one-period function of expected profit and its variance
V
f
= TT*(t,t-l) - jacr^Ct, t-1) (3)
where
ir*(t,t-l) = E O ) = conditional expectation of profit for time t, formed att_1 t time t-1,
l 2
a (t,t-l) = E [it - E , (tt )] = conditional variance of profit for time t,
7T t-1 t t-1 t formed at time t-1.
The criterion (3) may be justified as being consistent with expected utility maxi-
mization in the case where the underlying random variables are multivariate normal
and the utility function is characterized by constant absolute risk aversion, with
a being the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. For a risk averse producer
a > 0, while a = corresponds to risk neutrality.
By direct calculation, we obtain from (1) and (2)
rrMt.t-l) = P*^ y
t
+ E
t_i<v;} -^ cyl
c/(t,t-l) = a Z (t,t-l)y^ + 2cov
t _ 1
(P
t
,P
t
v')y
c
+ Var(P
t
vp
where cov , var denote the conditional covariance and variance respectively,
and p* a
2
(t t-1) denote the one period conditional mean and variance of the
t,t-l p
-5-
price for time t, formed at time t-1. In order to simplify the subsequent analysis,
it is useful to introduce an approximation based on the following argument. We shall
assume that there are n identical firms, each of which contributes equally to the
aggregate supply disturbance v , so that for the representative firm v' = v /n. We
shall assume that the price responds proportionally to the aggregate supply dis-
turbance v so that the conditional cross moments formed at time t-1 between P and
v are finite and of order 1; i.e., E , (P V ) = 0(1), where 0(«) denotes order
notation. Thus we have
Op(t,t-l) = Var
t_1
(P
t
) = 0(1)
E
t-i (vp - K-i (ptV = <>
cov
t_l(P t ,P t
v;) = i cov
t_l(P t ,P tv t )
= 0(i)
var (P
t
v«) »Vart-l (PtV = O(^)
n n
Assuming that the number of firms is sufficiently large, the expressions E , (P,.v' ) ,
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var n (P v'), cov (P ,P v') are all at least of an order smaller than a (t,t-l).t-1 t t t' t, tr p
Thus to the first order, we may approximate the one period mean and variance of
profit by
ir*(t,t-l) = P*
)t_ x y t
-\cy\
oJ(t,t-l) = a^(t,t-l)7^
Substituting these two expressions into (3) yields
vf
t -^1,^-1^1- 1 «%^>t-»y2 w
and maximizing V with respect to y , we derive the following expression for the
optimal planned output
P*
_
t.t-1
v • 2J
i c + aa (t, t-1)
P
Thus the planned output of the representative firm varies positively with the
expected spot price, and inversely with its one-period variance.
We turn now to the second group, speculators. In the present context they
are assumed to trade in inventories of the commodity in anticipation of price changes.
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We shall let i denote the net position in the commodity by the speculator entered
at time t-1. If i > 0, the speculator holds positive stocks of the commodity,
t-1
while i < denotes that he is holding the commodity short. The profit of
the representative speculator over the period (t-1, t) is postulated to be
< -wpt - p t-i } - K-i (5 >
j
where the quadratic term denotes the costs associated with trading in inventories.
These consist of storage costs (if i , > 0) together with transactions and
interest costs. While the assumption of quadratic costs is a gross simplication,
introduced to preserve linearity, the requirement d > is necessary for a well-
defined inventory demand function to exist, once a futures market is introduced;
see section 3 below.
Analogous to firms, the objective function of the speculator is to maximize
v
?
-= wptt-i -w - M-i - K^^t-i • (6)
The parameter £ measures the degree of risk aversion and need bear no particular rela-
tion to a. Maximizing (6) with respect to i t_i» yields the following inventory demand
function
t ,t-l t-1
L t-1
=
2 -C X
d + go (t, t-1)
P
This specification has been familiar since the time of Muth (1961). It asserts that
risk averse speculators take a long or short position in inventories, depending upon
whether they expect the spot price to rise or fall over the period.
It is not necessary to derive the demand functions for the third group of
market participants, consumers, from underlying utility maximization. Instead, it
suffices to simply postulate some convenient aggregate function.
B. Aggregate Market Relationships
We assume that aggregate demand for the commodity, D , is specified by
the linear relationship
D - A - aP + u A, a > . (7)
-7-
Summing over the representation firms leads to the aggregate supply function S
S = bP* , + v (8)
t t,t-l t v *
where
b 5 -± . (9)
c + ac (t,t-l)
P
Strictly speaking, the coefficient in the aggregate supply function should be
multiplied by the number of representative firms, but without essential loss of
generality this factor can be set to unity. We shall assume that the probability
2distribution of P is stationary, so that the one period variance a (t,t-l) is
t P
2independent of t and shall be denoted simply by (1)
.
Now that even though the representative firm may make its production
plans by ignoring the correlation between P and v' at the aggregate level, tbjs
stochastic component of S must be taken into account. The disturbances u and v
are assumed to be additive, independently distributed over time, and to have zero
means and finite variances
E(u
t
) = E(v
t
) =
2 2 2 2
K(uJ) - V BCv*) = <
E(Vt } = °uv •
ft
Likewise, the aggregate demand for inventories, I , , is postulated to be
h-i = * (p t,t-i - p t -i } (10)
where
go 5 — . (11)
d + Ba (1)
P
The final component of the aggregate model is the market clearing condition
D
t
+ \ = S t + rt-l * (12)
C. Solution for Spot Price
Substituting (7), (8) and (10) into (12) yields the following difference
equation in P,., PJ^ , P*
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A - aP + u + u> (P*
,
, - P )
t t t+l,t t J
= ui(P* , - P .) + bP* , + v . (13)t,t-l t-1 t,t-l t * J
We define the long-run average price attained when expectations are
realized (P* = P* = P ) by P, it follows from (13) that
Next, we define the following variables in deviation form, p = P - P,
P
?+l,t
~= P
t+l,t "
? and let
• = u
t
- v
t
equation (13) becomes
where
-ap
t
+ "(p*
+ljt " P t ) - bp* ft _ x + -(p*^^ - p^) - e t (15)
E(e„) = 0, E(e?) = a
2
= a
2
+ a
2
+ 2a
t t e u v uv
Equation (15) describes the behavior of current market clearing prices in terms of
their conditional variances. It is observed to be identical to Muth (1961, eq. (4.12)
and Turnovsky (1979, eq. (10)). Thus following the solution procedure of these authors
(which employs standard rational expectations methodology) , the stable solution for p
is given by
*t *t-l a + aj(l-r)
where r is the smaller root (which is real and lies in the range < r < 1) of the
quadratic equation
u>(l-r) 2 = (a+b)r . (17)
For convenience the formal argument is repeated in Appendix A. Thus we deduce
that the one-period variance a (1) and asymptotic variance a of spot prices are fj
given by 2
2
CT
e
aUl) = » (18)
P [a+u>(l-r)r
9 a^(l) a
2
a
2
= -2 = i (19)
P 2 2 .2
l-r
Z (l-0[a-ho(l-r)r
where r is the smaller root of (17), and b, cj are given by (9) and (11) respectively.
-9-
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Formally, the expressions for P and a given in (14), (19) are identical
to the corresponding expressions' obtained by Turnovsky (1979) for rational expecta-
tions and private storage. There is however, one fundamental difference. From
the expressions (9) and (11) the parameters b, co are seen to be functions of the
2 2
one-period variance a (1), and therefore of a and r. As a consequence, equations
P P
2(17) and (19) define a pair of highly non-linear relationships between a and r,
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or equivalently a (1) and r. As pointed out in a slightly simplified version of
this model by McCafferty and Driskill (1980) , this non-linearity is the cause of
possible non-uniqueness and non-existence problems concerning rational expectations
equilibria. That is, when we take the definitions of b and cj given in (9) and (11)
into account, it is possible that there is in fact no value or r lying in the range
< r < 1, or alternatively there may be a multiplicity of such roots. We shall
note below an example where such non-existence problems may arise.
3. FUTURES MARKET
A. Underlying Microeconomic Behavior
We now introduce a futures market and assume that at time t-1, when produc-
tion decisions must be made, the firm can enter into a contract to deliver a fixed
specified quantity of output at an agreed contract price at time t. Profit at
time t is therefore given by
*t
= p
t
(y t - \-i ) + p t-i z t-i - Kt
where y , y , P are as defined previously and
P , = one period futures price prevailing at time t-1 for
delivery at time t,
z , = firm's net position in futures contracts entered into
t-1 . ,
at txme t-1.
If z , > 0, the rirm is selling futures contracts, while z , < denotes a pur-
t-1 6 t-1 v
chase of futures contracts.
Repeating the analysis of Section 2, the firm's objective (3) with the
addition of a futures market, becomes
V-10-
t
e p
?,t-i (^t - \-{> +
pf
t-i
z
t-i - Kt -H (1)(Ft - z t-i )2 • (2o)
The firm's decision problem is to choose: (i) its planned level of output y ,
(ii) its net position in the futures market z , , to maximize (20) . The first
order optimality condition are
Pt,t-i- c^t -^p^^t-V^ = °
*Li - *ht-i + aala)(*t - zt-i> = °
from which we obtain the explicit solutions
P
f
,
y
t
-
-*± (21)
p f
z
¥
.
= -£=i- + —j (Pf . - P* . ) . (22)t_1 c
aa
2
(l)
t_1 t
'
t"1
P
The implications of these two equations for producers have been dis-
cussed by Turnovsky (1981). There are two important aspects worth highlighting.
First, in (21) the futures price replaces the expected spot price as the relevant
price. governing total production plans; secondly the sensitivity of supply to
price changes is increased. Risk and the degree of risk aversion play no role
in determining the total production decision; rather these determine the hedging
or speculative behavior undertaken by the firm and are described by the second
term in (22). Four possible cases can be identified and have been discussed;
see also Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980).
With the existence of a futures market, we assume that speculators may
now speculate in the purchase and sales of futures contracts, as well as in inven-
tories. We shall let x , denote the net position of the representative speculator
in the futures market entered at time t-1, with x > denoting sales and
x < denoting the purchases of futures contracts, respectively. The profit
of the speculator over the period (t-l,t) now becomes
s ... _ v . ,-f - s . i^2 1 ,_.2\ '= \-l i? t - P t-1 } + *t-l (P t-l - V - *f1 - 2 -t-1dit' C-JL Z
while the objective is to choose i , and X , to maximize
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vt^ Vi^.t-i - p c-i } + xt-i (p t-i - p?,t-i>
•RrH2(1)(it-i-Vi)2 • (23)
The first order optimality conditions are
P£,t-1 - P t-1 "
di
t-l " %2(1)(i t-l - Xt-1 } = °
which may be solved to yield
Vl " I (P t-l " P t-1 ) W
Vi = I (p t-i - p t-i> + 7T7T (p t-i - pt,t-i> • < 25 >
So (1)
P
These equations are parallel to (24) and (25) derived above for the firm.
In the first place, the total inventory decision, i , is separated from the hedg-
ing decision. Total inventory demand depends upon the difference between the
current spot price and the current one-period futures price. Moreover, the
coefficient in this demand function is now increased to d and is independent of
risk or the coefficient of risk aversion. Indeed, (24) highlights the significance
of assuming d > 0. If instead we have d = 0, P = P
_
,
and the current spot
and futures prices are always equal. The extent to which inventory holders hedge
their holdings of inventories, or alternatively speculate on the futures market,
is reflected in the second term of (25) which depends upon the difference between
the current futures prices and the expected spot price for next period. In this
case, four possibilities again exist. First, if ?
t _,
= P£
t i
then x - = i
fc
_i
and the inventory holders hedge their entire holdings of inventories. Secondly if
Sa
2 (l)P + dP*
P t ~1 t.t-1
< pf < p*
o 2, 1N t-1 t,t-ld + Sa (1)
P
then < x < i and a fraction of inventory holdings will be hedged. Thirdly, if
f Bgp^t-l + d? t,t-l
P < 7.
t-1 9C l
d + 0CT (1)
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x < and the inventory holders will speculate by buying futures contracts.
Finally, if P
_,
> P* , they will speculate by selling futures contracts in
excess of their total inventory holdings.
In addition, there may be pure speculators, who deal only in futures
contracts. But these do not add anything and can be ignored without any loss of A
generality.
B. Aggregate Market Relationships
The aggregate relationships describing the goods and futures markets may
now be specified as follows
Goods Market
D
fc
= A - aP
t
+ u
t
(26)
S
t
* B + \ P t-1 + V t (27)
\-l = K-l - P t-1> (28) I
D
t
+ \ = S t + \-l (29)
Futures Market
z
, i
= i ? l i + -T— (p t i " p ? t i } (30)t"1 c t_1
aa
2
(l)
X t
'
"1
P
p
z
t-i
+ x
t-i
=
°
(32)
where Z , X represent aggregates over the representative individuals. Again
the coefficients on these aggregate equations should be multiplied by the number J
of individuals in the aggregate, but as before this is absorbed in the other parameters.
The spot market is basically as before and requires no further comment.
For equilibrium in the futures market to prevail, the excess demand for futures
contracts by both producers and speculators must sum to zero. Substituting (30)
and (31) into (32), yields
*?<!> l °
'
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i + 4 P* + — P
t,t-l d r t-l
P.
,
=
-^ ; 7;
~ : : (33)t-1
a
2
p
a)
k +7
a 6,
+ 1 + 7c d
Thus with risk averse behavior, the current futures price is a weighted average
(with weights summing to less than unity) of the current spot price and the expected
future spot price. Only if either producers or speculators are risk, neutral so that
a * or 3 + does P = P*
1
and the futures price become an unbiased pre-
dictor of the future spot price. Otherwise, the futures price is a biased predictor,
with the direction of the bias depending upon the magnitudes of the cost parameters
c and d.
Although it is possible for P , to overpredict P*
_, , on average one
would expect it to underpredict the future spot price. To see this, we may note
that P will be shown below to follow an equation analogous to (16) , (see (41)
below) so that the expected price is given by
P?,t-l- F=r l (Pt-l- F) (34)
where < r < 1, is determined below. If P happens to equal its equilibrium
value P, it is evident from (33) and (34) that. P < P* = P. Only for values
of P sufficiently greater than the long-run mean P will the current futures
price overpredict the future spot price.
The implied behavior for firms and speculators can be obtained by sub-
stituting (33) and (34) into their respective optimality conditions. Again taking
the case where P , = P , we can show that at that point
t-1 *
< z
t_1
< y
x
t-l
< \-l < ° •
That is, firms will sell futures to partially hedge their planned output, while
speculators will sell their inventories short and purchase futures contracts in
excess of the short position they have taken.
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C. Solution for Spot and Futures Prices
To solve the system, we first substitute the relevant demand and supply
functions into the goods market and futures market equilibrium conditions. These
yield the following pair of equations in the spot and futures prices
A _ ap
t
+ I (p* - P
t
) - i P f
t_x
+ i (P^ - P
t_ x
) - e
t
c t-1 a e
aj(l)
f If(p L _ p* ) + — (P - P ) =
^t-1 t,t-r d ^t-1 rt-r u
=rf
The long-run average spot and futures prices P, P respectively, are given by the
expressions
P =
a
1
+ b
1
(35)
P* -
where for notational convenience we let
1
a 0j r
o-2(l)
1
a 6, c dc^l)
p < p
a +
a^l)
1/cd
— \
a 6
+ L + Jc d
c a_(l)
k
+ 7
b
i
E
3 '
1 '1
a « + ic 4
rr
2 M ^
(36)
(37)
(38)
Written in this way we see that the expression for the long-run equilibrium spot
price ? is of the same form as (14) with a, b replaced by a., b^^ respectively.
The other point to observe is that the long-run average futures price is in
general below the long-run average spot price. This is necessary in order to
induce producers to hedge permanently part of their output. The long-run
bias will disappear if either a •* 0, 6 * 0, c * °°, or d * 0.
Substituting for P from the futures market equilibrium condition, the
following difference equation is obtained for the spot price, expressed in deviation
form
-15-
"Vt + ui (pt+i,t - p t } = Vt,t-i + u i (p?,t-i - Pt-i5 - e t < 39 >
where a..
, b. are defined in (37) and (38) , and
a Bdahl)
*~n
-
; r (40)
1
dajtt)
I + i + I + iaged
The crucial thing to observe about this equation is that it is of identical form
to (15) applicable in the absence of a futures market, with a, b, to, as defined
previously, being replaced by a , b. , oj., respectively, the latter being defined
in (37), (38) and (40). The effect of the futures market on the behavior of the
spot price is therefore equivalent to inducing changes in the price sensitivity of:
(a) the demand function; (b) the supply function; (c) the inventory demand function.
Of course only the latter two actually change, since by assumption a remains constant.
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The solution for the spot price (in deviation form) is therefore
e
t
P
t
'
r
lP t-l
+
a
L
+ ^(1-r^ (41)
where r.. is the smaller root (0 < r < 1) of the quadratic equation
0J
1
(l-r
1 )
2
= (a
x
+ b
1
)r
] _
(42)
The one-period variance and the asymptotic variance of the spot price are given by
2
2 °e(/(I) = S (43)
p [a
x
+ co
1
(l-r
1
)]*
2
CT
2
= S (44)
P (l-rp[a
x
+ o
)l
(l-r
1
)]
Z
where r is the smaller root of (42) and now a.. , b. , and u) are given by (37)
,
(38)
,
and (40).
Using the steady-state relationship (36) to write (33) and (34) in deriva-
tion form, the current futures price can be expressed in terms of the current spot
price as
-16-
t-1
fl
,Ha
p
2
(l) l«
1
a B
oj(l)
t-1 Dp
, where | r\ | < 1
Thus given (41), the evolution of p is determined. From this it follows that
the asymptotic variance of the futures price, a,, is
2 2 2 2
a r = n a < a
f P P
and a similar relationship holds between the corresponding one-period variances.
Consequently both in the short run and in the long run the futures price is more
stable than the spot price.
4 . COMPARISON OF LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SPOT PRICES : GENERAL CASE
We now attempt to compare the long-run means and variances of the spot
price with, and without, the futures market. The solutions for the determination
of the spot price in these two circumstances have been derived in Sections 2 and 3
above and for convenience they are summarized below.
No Futures Market
P(N) =
a + b
= _P_
a„(l;N)
a (N) ,
v 1-r
(45)
(46)
a:(l;N) -
[a + K(l-r)]'
oi(l-r) = (a + b)r
1
b =
c + ao (1;N)
P
(47)
(48)
(49)
d + Bo (1;N)
P
(50)
where the index N in P ( ) , a ( ) , is used to designate these variables in the absence
2
of a futures market and a (1;N) denotes the one-period variance. All other parameters
remain as defined previously.
Futures Market
-17-
P(F) =
a
i
+ b
l
(51)
af(F)'=-£
a U;F)
1-r
a:(l;F) =
[a
±
+ a
)l
(l-r
1
)]'
(52)
(53)
(JD
1
(l-r
1
)^ = (a
x
+ b
1
)r
1 (54)
a = a +
1/cd
a
p
(l,F)
1
a 3
+
k
+ ic d
f
b
l
=
ca|(l;F) [a 6
aJ(l;F>
a 6
+ i + ?c d
» =
dap(l;F)
)
aJ(l;F)
a e
+ i + Tc d
(55)
(56)
(57)
where F is used to identify the futures market.
Turning first to the set of equations relevant in the absence of a
2
futures market, it is seen that the four variables a (1,N), r, b, and to are jointly
determined by equations (47)-(50). We have already commented on the non-linear
nature of these equations and how this may create problems of non-existence and
non-uniqueness of solutions. Having determined these four quantities (assuming
_ 2
that a solution exists), the long run mean P (N) and asymptotic variance a (N) of
the spot price are then determined from (45) and (46) respectively.
The second set of equations, applicable in the presence of a futures
market, has the same general structure. Indeed, it will be observed that equa-
tions (51)-(54) are identical to the corresponding equations (45)-(48) in the
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first set, with a , b, and u). replacing a, b, and to, respectively. The differences
are in the determination of the parameters a, b, to so that the effects of the
futures market can be analyzed in terms of its impact on these latter parameters.
These two sets of equations form the basis for the analysis of a futures
market on the distribution of the spot price. It is possible by substitution to
2
reduce equations (45)- (50) to a pair of equations in a (N) and r, and likewise
for the second set, (51)-(57). In either case, the relationships turn out to be
highly complex and to be quite intractable for analytical purposes, especially
in the light of the possible non-existence and non-uniqueness problems we have
noted might arise. Indeed, it is possible for a feasible equilibrium value of
2 2
a (N) say, but not a (F) to exist, and vice versa.
But without explicit comparison of these two sets of equations in the
general case, a good deal of insight can be obtained by exploiting the similarity
of the solution structure in terms of the parameters a, b, and to. Specifically,
we may consider (45) as defining P(N) in terms of a, b, while (46)- (48) determine
2 2
a (1;N), a (N),r in terms of a, b, and to and in particular, we may write
P(N) = G(a, b)
Op(N) = H(a, b, to)
Moreover, the corresponding equations (51) and (52)-(54) determine P(F) and
2 2
a (1,F), a (F) , r as identical functions of a^ b,, tu,, and thus we have
P(F) - G(ar bx )
ffp(F) = H(a
]_,
b
1 ,
oj
1 )
.
For these functions G(«) and H(*) we can establish (suppressing the indices N, F)
¥- < ° i H- < ° (58)3a db
2 2 2
3a 3a 3a
-E-<0;^<0;—^<0. (59)
3a '3b '3to
Inequalities (58) are obtained by direct partial differentiation of (45) or (51)
while (59) are somewhat more complicated and are derived in Appendix B. Given that
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b, u (and a.., b, , and u. ) are endogenous, these partial derivatives require
careful interpretation. They describe ceteris paribus changes in the particular
coefficients, which in turn arise from changes in underlying exogenous parameters.
For example, in order for b to increase while u remains constant, a decrease in
c say (which generates the increase in b) must be offset by an appropriate change
in some other parameter d say, which will exactly offset the change in w which
2
would otherwise occur through the induced changes in r and a (1) . Noting these
comments, we see that an increase in the price responsiveness of demand and
supply will tend to lower the equilibrium mean price and the asymptotic variance
of the spot price. An increase in the price responsiveness of storage will tend
to stabilize the spot price. These statements hold whether or not a futures
market exists. Given that the functions G(«) and H(») are identical in the two
cases, it follows from (58) and (59) that if the futures market were to lead to
—
— 2 2
an increase in the parameters a, b, id, then P (F) < P CO > o (F) < a (N) ; the
futures market will reduce the mean of the spot price as well as reducing its
variance. But we are unable to demonstrate this in the general case.
Some insight into the role of the futures market is obtained by focus-
ing on each parameter separately. Turning first to (55), we see that a. > a, so
that one effect of the futures market is equivalent to increasing the price
sensitivity of demand and this has an unambiguously s tabilizing effect on the
spot price. By contrast, the effects of the futures market on the price sensitivity
of the supply and inventory demand functions are not unambiguous. From the
definitions of b , b, w
1
, oj , we can establish the following effects on the rela-
tive magnitudes of the relevant slope coefficients
sgnCbj-b) = sgn[(ad-6c)0 2 (l:N) + S (c+d) (a^djN) - CTp(l;F))]
sgntoj-'a)) = sgn[(Sc-ad)a2(l;N) + a (c+d) (a 2 (1;N) - <j2(1;F))]
Because of the fact that the one-period variances are endogenous, nothing definite
can be inferred. Nevertheless, a comparison of the first coefficients in these
-20-
two expressions suggests that some offsetting effects on the supply and inventory
2 • 2
price responsiveness are likely to operate. Clearly if a (1;N) = a (1;F) the
introduction of the futures market will affect the slopes of the supply and
inventory demand functions differently; one will tend to be stabilizing, but
the other destabilizing. It is this conflict in effects which makes the general
2 2
comparison of a (N) with a (F) so difficult.
P P
One can carry out this kind of general qualitative analysis on P (N)
and P(F). While the general comparison is again intractable (since it involves
the asymptotic variances) , one can establish that a sufficient condition, but
certainly not necessary condition, for P(F) < P(N) is that
a
2 (l;F)
,
-* <^ • (60)
aJa;H) 6
5. COMPARISON OF LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SPOT PRICES: SPECIAL CASES
Despite the fact that it seems impossible to make general comparisons
regarding the stabilizing properties of a futures market, it is possible to draw
firm conclusions in a number of important special cases. In some instances this
can be done more conveniently by considering the expressions summarized in (45)-
(50) and (51)-(57); in other cases it is simpler to compare the expressions for the
coefficients (a, b, id) with (a , b., u^) and to use (58) and (59).
A. Risk Neutral Speculators
This is obtained by setting B = 0. Thus we deduce from equations (49),
(50), (55), (56) and (57) that a - a, b1
- 1/c > b, and u^ = 1/d - u>. In this
case, the only effect of the futures market is to increase the price responsiveness
of the supply curve, leaving the slopes of the demand and inventory demand curves
unchanged. Hence it follows from (58) and (59) that
a
2
(F) < a
2
(N)
P P
P(F) < P(N) .
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Thus the presence of risk neutral speculators (in conjunction with risk averse
producers) ensures that the futures market has a stabilizing effect on the spot
price, while also reducing its long-run mean.
B. Risk Neutral Producers
This case is parallel and is characterized by a = 0. We deduce from
equations (49), (50), (55), (56) and (57) that a
±
= a, fa. = 1/c = b, u, = 1/d > to.
The net effect of the future market is therefore to increase the price responsiveness
of the inventory demand function, leaving the slopes of the other functions unchanged.
Thus again (59) implies the futures market stabilizes the spot price, although its
long-run mean remains unchanged.
C. Risk Neutral Speculators and Producers
If both producers and speculators are risk neutral, a = 3 = 0. In this
case we find a, = a, b, = b, to, = to. The slopes of the demand function, supply func-
tion, and inventory demand function all remain unchanged and the introduction of the
futures market leaves the long-run mean and variance of the spot price unaffected.
Taken together, the results in 5.A-5.C make good intuitive sense. As
long as one group in the market is risk averse, the certainty offered by the futures
market will increase the price responsiveness of the behavioral relationship pertain-
ing to the risk averse group, thereby providing some stabilizing influence to the
spot price.
D. Pure Production
This case arises when d + °°, so that inventories are infinitely costly to
store. No inventories are therefore held and the model reduces to the no-storage
case analyzed in the previous papers by Kawai (1981) and Turnovsky (1981) . Letting
d -* " in (50) and (57), we find 10 » to, =0 and hence (47) and (54) imply r = r.. = 0.
It then immediately follows that
-22-
2
a (N) = c/(F) =
-f
P P
a
2
so that the futures market leaves the variance of the spot price unchanged. This
result is identical to that obtained in these earlier studies which found that in
the absence of storage, gains in price stability arise only if the additive dis-
turbances are autocorrelated. There are no gains, if they are independently dis-
tributed over time, as is being assumed here.
E. Pure Inventory Holding Case
In this case production costs are infinitely large (c -* °°) . No produc-
tion occurs, and the model reduces to one of pure inventory holdings. Letting c *• °»,
<
Id(49) and (56) imply b = b, = 0. Equations (46)-(48) and (52)-(54) together yie
2™ ae (1-r) 2~ ge ^V
a
P
(N) = ~
-TEc' aP
(F) =
~-±^Tr
a a 1
Inserting these expressions into (46) and (52) , and hence into (50) and (52) respec-
tively, and using (47) and (54), we can show that r > r. Hence we deduce that
J-
a
9 9
(N) > a (F) so tnat the long-run variance of the spot price is once again decreased.
P P
2 2
Furthermore, a (1;N) > a (1;F), implying that the mean spot price is reduced as well;
see (60)
.
F. Constant Marginal Inventory Costs
To illustrate the possible problems of non-existence of equilibrium, we shall
consider the case where d = 0, so that the marginal costs of holding inventories are
constant. Setting d = in (55)- (57), the solution in the presence of a futures
market simplifies to
a (F) = a
i
P e 1+r 2
Ca+7)
c
(1-r )(^+^ L
c/(F)(l+r.)
P 1
2
These equations may be solved explicitly for r and a (F)
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r = 2
a
e
2
r
2 ,1 . lw , 1. .
2,^
J
e
[a
e
" (
a
+
^
)(a+
c
)]
a (F) =
It is evident from this last pair of equations that for a consistent solution to
2
exist (i.e., the variance a (F) >. 0) , we require
2 A^U, .1%
CTe^ (a + ^)(a+ c }
If this inequality is reversed—as it might well be if, for example, the degree of
risk aversion is sufficiently low— then no_ consistent solution will exist in the
presence of a futures market.
While similar problems of non-existence arise in the absence of a futures
market, the conditions are in general different. Suppose that inventory holders
are risk neutral. Setting (3=0, the feasibility condition is clearly violated.
On the other hand, setting 3=0, together with d = in (50) implies r = 1.
Eliminating oi(l-r) between (46) and (47) the asymptotic variance for price may be
written as :
2
a
e
(1- r)
a_(N) =
P (l+r)(a+br) 2
2
and setting r = 1 we find a (N) = 0. That is, with risk neutral speculators and
constant inventory costs, a perfectly feasible solution exists in the absence of a
futures market.
While each of these examples is special, the range of cases they cover
suggests that they should provide a reasonable indication as to the effects of
futures trading on spot price in the general case. One can identify among them
polar pairs for appropriate types of behavior or parameter values. Take for example,
cases A and B, which represent one such polar pair. These two examples show that
if only one group is risk averse (producers in the former case, speculators in the
latter) , then the opening of a futures market will have both a stabilizing effect
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on the spot price, while also reducing its long-run mean. Provided that the
effects of introducing risk averse behavior to these two sets of agents simul-
taneously are approximately additive, it seems reasonable to expect that the
general case, in which both producers and speculators are risk averse, should
not respond too differently from the two extremes.
Cases D and E represent another polar pair. In the pure production model
(no inventories) it is shown that the introduction of the futures market has no
effect on the distribution of the spot price, at least under the present assump-
tions regarding stochastic specification. In the other extreme of pure inventory
holding (no production) the futures market has the usual stabilizing effect.
Again, assuming that the effects of introducing production and inventorying behavior
simultaneously are approximately additive, one would expect that the general case
to be some kind of average of these two cases, so that the futures market should
again have a stabilizing effect on the spot price.
A third polar pair is to contrast risk neutral speculators (g = 0) with
infinitely risk averse speculators (g *<*>). While the latter case is of no par-
ticular interest (except as a polar case) and is therefore not reported, it can be
shown that like case B it implies that futures trading is stabilizing. The general
case, which in this case corresponds to finite risk averse speculation (0 < g < °°)
,
should once again be some kind of average of these two extremes, suggesting again
that futures trading will have a stabilizing effect.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND SOME FURTHER ISSUES
In this paper we have anlyzed the effects of futures trading in a market
for a storable commodity, in which producers and speculators are assumed to be
risk averse and their respective behavior is derived from explicit optimization.
From these underlying micro considerations, the specifications of the aggregate
supply and inventory demand functions are derived. A critical aspect is how the
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parameters of these functions change with the introduction of the futures market
and it is through these induced parameter changes that the futures market exerts
its effect on the spot price. We have focused on two main issues.
First, we have discussed some of the properties of the underlying
behavioral functions and shown how the introduction of the futures market introduces
a "separation" into both production and inventory decisions. In both cases, the
total decision depends upon the futures price and is independent of risk and risk
attitudes. These influence the degree of hedging activity. We have also con-
sidered in some detail the relationship between the futures price and the expected
future spot price, an issue which has been widely discussed in the literature. We
have shown how the current futures price is a weighted average (with weights summing
to less than unity) of the current spot price and the expected future spot price.
Secondly, we have analyzed the effects of the futures market on both the
long-run average spot price and its variance. In general, it seems impossible to
draw any definitive conclusions on this issue. This is partly because of non-
existence problems which may arise due to the non-linearity of the underlying model
and partly due to the intractability of therelevant expressions. We are, however,
able to break down the impact of the futures market into effects which operate
through the slopes of the demand, supply, and inventory demand, functions, and
these turn out to provide insight as to how the introduction of the futures mar-
kets impinges on the distribution of the spot price. A number of special cases
were considered and apart from one case where there is zero effect, we find that
the futures market both stabilizes the long-run spot rate as well as lowering its
long run mean. The range of extremes covered by these examples suggests that
the response of the long run distribution for the spot price in the general case,
which in a sense is interior to them all, should not be too different.
To conclude, two further points should be made. First, as noted at the
outset, our analysis is restricted to final demand and supply disturbances, our
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treatment of the latter involving some reasonable approximations. Kawai (1981b)
has pointed out that the introduction of a futures market will most likely
provide a destabilizing influence for disturbances originating with inventory
demand. With a little reflection this result is not surprising. Clearly if
inventory behavior is subject to randomness, then any institutional change,
such as the introduction of a futures market, which tends to encourage this activity,
will thereby introduce more randomness into the system.
Secondly, one can easily extend the analysis to consider questions relat-
ing to spot and futures market intervention by some stabilization authority. Some
work along these lines has been done, but is not reported here. Again it turns out
to be difficult to draw definitive conclusions as to the stabilizing properties
of these policies. The analysis does suggest that, at least in many important
instances, spot market intervention is likely to be the more effective means of
stabilizing both the spot price and the futures price. But further investigation
of this issue is better left for some other occasion.
APPENDIX
A. Rational Expectations Solution to (15)
The condition for market clearing is given by
-ap
t
+ «<P*
+ljt-Pt ) = bp* jt_ x + "(P^.i-P^) - e t (A.l)
Taking conditional expectations of this equation at time t-1 for an arbitrary period
j = 0, 1, 2, . .
.
, t+j
,
yields
Up
t+j+l,t-l " (2a)+a+b)p t+j ,t-l + "P tVj-l,t-l " ° <A ' 2 >
where in deriving (A. 2) we have used the well-known property of conditional
expectations
E
t-l
[E
t
(p t+j )] = Et-lP t+j <A - 3 >
and have defined
P t-l,t-l " P t-1
This last assumption is simply a statement that the price at time t-1 is known at
that time, so that the conditional expectation is simply the true observed value.
Equation (A. 2) is a second order difference equation in the predictions d*F t+j, t-1'
the solution to which is
p
t+j -i, t-i
= v^W + B2^- i)ri (A - 4 >
where r.. and r~ are the roots to the quadratic equation
oj(l-r) 2 = (a+b)r (A. 5)
It is immediately seen that r.. and r_ are both real and positive, lying on opposite
sides of unity, with say < r, < 1, r~ > 1- Unless B2 (t-1) = 0, the forecast of
prices expected to prevail in the infinite future will diverge. In order to rule
this out, we set B~ (t-1) = 0. Moreover taking j = and recalling our definition
of p*
, ,
, we see B, (t-1) = p ,. Hence the solution (A. 4) simplifies tort-1, t-1 1 't-l
p t+j-l,t-l rlp t-l 3-0. 1. 2. ... (A.6)
Equation (A.6) gives the rational expectations held at time t-1 over varying future
time horizons. Setting j = 1 gives the one period rational forecast
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P t\t-1
= r
lP t-l (A - 7 >
Substituting (A. 7) into (A.l), the spot price follows' the first order stochastic
difference equation
-ap
t
+ «(r
1
-l)p
t
= br
1p t_1
+ ioO^-Dp^ - e
£
which we may rewrite as
,
6
t
p
t
= rp
t-l
+
a-hu(l-r)
where for convenience we drop the subscript 1 from r. This last equation is the
solution (16) given in the text.
B. Derivation of Inequalities (59)
Consider the pair of equations
2
2
a
e
% = 2 2 (A - 8)P (1-r )[a+a)(l-r)] Z
u(l-r) 2 = (a+b)r (A. 9)
Eliminating r between them yields the function
2
a = H(a, b, ou)
P
defined in the text. To determine the signs of the partial derivatives it is con-
venient to define
4> = (l-r)
2 [a-kj(l-r)] 2 . (A. 10)
It then follows immediately that to establish the results in the text it is necessary
and sufficient to show
||- > i - a, b, u . (A. 11)
(i) Differentiating the pair of equations (A. 8) and (A. 9) with respect to
a, we obtain
!*- 2[a+o) (l-r)]{(l-r) 2 (l-a)ff) - r[a-ho(l-r) ]ff} (A. 12)
If a-H^Jd-r) < ° (A - 13)
Since < r < 1, and the coefficient on 3r/Sa in (A. 12) is negative, it immediately
2
follows from these two equations that 3iJ>/3a > 0; i.e., 3a /3a < 0.
\
-A3-
(ii) Differentiating (A. 8) and (A. 9) with respect to b, yields
||= 2[a*(l-r)l(-(l-r2).|- r[a+u(l-r) ]|| (A.14)
lb
=
a+b+z'Jd-r)
< °
<A - 15 >
which as in (i) combine to imply 3© /3b > 0.
(iii) Differentiating (A. 8) and (A. 9) with respect to u, yields
|£ - 2[a+w (l-r)]{(l-r 2 )(l-r-co|^) - r [a+u(l-r)|^} (A. 16)
2
¥" iSin S > (A.17)3o> a+b+2oi (1-r) v '
Substituting (A.17) into (A. 16) we obtain
90 2[a+u)(l-r)](l-r) 2 [a+b+br-m(l-r)]
30) " a+b+2aJ (l-r)
>
°
(A ' 18)
2implying 3a /3oj < 0.
FOOTNOTES
*The helpful comments of three referees and the Co-editor are gratefully acknowledged.
1. Early contributions to the theory of futures price determination and the potential
role of futures market for price stabilization, see, e.g., Working (1958), Stein
(1961) and McKinnon (1967).
2. The idea that speculators may have superior information is considered by Danthine
(1978).
3. This assumption can easily be relaxed without any significant alteration to the m
analysis.
4. The assumption that costs depend upon planned rather than actual output can be
justified if costs are incurred on non-stochastically determined inputs, chosen
at the time the production decision is made. The random fluctuations in output
appearing in revenue are due to stochastic disturbances in production conditions,
which occur after the inputs have been purchased.
5. The additive form of the disturbance term appearling in (2) corresponds to a pro-
duction function f (m ) of the form y = f (m ) + v' where m is a vector of inputs.
The result we shall obtain below, that production and futures trading decisions may
be "separated," depends on this assumption and would not hold for a more general
specification of the disturbance term y = f(m ,v'); see Danthine (1978).
6. The general expression for the optimal planned .output is given by
-
p
t,t-i - ; ^(y y;>
y
t 1
c + ao (t,t-l)
P
To derive the approximation used in the text it is sufficient to observe that the
covariance term cov (P , P
f
v l) is 0(l/n). The advantage in reporting all the
approximations is that the expressions for V^ given in (4) and (20) can be simpli-
fied at the outset.
7. The futures contracts we shall consider are for single period which coincides
the production period. A brief discussion of multiperiod futures contracts is
contained in Turnovsky (1979)
.
8. The firm may (i) hedge its total planned output; (ii) hedge a fraction of the
planned output; (iii) speculate by buying futures contracts; (iv) speculate by
selling futures contracts in excess of its planned production. These are
parallel to the possibilities for inventory holders we note below.
9. Taking the one-period conditional expectations of (41), yields /
P t,t-1
= r
lp t-l
which in non-deviation form is precisely (34)
.
10. Writing 1
cao (1;N)
b = £
aa (1;N)
P
U) =
-F2-
1
dB<Jp(l;N)
1
-
1
2 '
Sa (1;N)
P
d
the analogies between b, and b and between o»
1
and cj become readily apparent.
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